The Well-Being of Young Generations in Italy: Comparing Political Participation of Native Youths and Youths from a Migrant Background

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Abstract

In this study, we analysed well-being of young people in Italy through the lens of their political participation. Scholars suggest that political participation is a crucial aspect of youth well-being and a key characteristic of a cohesive society. Focusing on individuals aged 14 to 35 still living with their family of origin, we compare Italian natives with their first- and second-generation migrant peers. We based our analysis on two different national household surveys, both carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2012: the survey on the 'Condizione e integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri' [Condition and Social Integration of Foreign Citizens] and the 'Aspetti della vita quotidiana' [Multipurpose Survey on the Aspects of Everyday Life]. Our results revealed that natives are more likely to be involved in politics compared to their migrant peers. However, the gap is fully explained by differences in socio-economic background and family political socialisation. When these aspects are controlled, data suggest that young people with migrant backgrounds are more likely to be involved in activities that reflect general interest in politics, such as discussing politics, seeking information on Italian politics, and listening to political debates, compared to their native counterparts.

Keywords: *Political participation, Young generations, Second generations, Immigrant youths, Well-being indicators, Family political socialisation*

1. Introduction

Political engagement is a crucial aspect of well-being and a vital characteristic of a cohesive society (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Putnam 2000; Pacek and Radcliff 2008; Pacheco and Lange 2010; Eurofound 2018). Political participation is becoming increasingly considered 'an integral dimension of the quality of life' (CMEPSP 2009: 50). Youth-led political activities, in particular, have the potential to enhance projects and policy reforms with positive spillover effects on the whole community's well-being (Hope and Jagers 2014). For this reason, the supposed 'eclipse' of young generations from the political scene (Ricolfi 2002) is a matter of concern and a subject of intense academic and public debate. Despite the rhetoric of an increasing disenchantment of young people from politics, young generations have found new ways to make their voice heard in the process of the 'reinvention' of politics (Beck 1997). Indeed, youngsters are increasingly engaged in new practices of political participation that configure themselves as informal and non-institutionalized (Juris and Pleyers 2009; Alteri, Leccardi, Raffini 2016; Genova 2018; Pitti 2018). Despite engaging in new and original forms of political engagement, the family of origin still plays a crucial role in shaping the political maturation of children and youths, significantly driving their interest and involvement in politics (Cicognani et al. 2012; Forbrig 2005). The family is an incubator for political socialisation, but at the same time replicates and reinforces disparities in political participation across generations. This factor could potentially interact with the migration background of the family of origin. In fact, several studies show that, despite being a consistent component of the population, migrants are less likely to participate in politics than natives (Penninx et al. 2004; Morales and Giugni 2011; Kaldur et al. 2012; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013).

In the light of this, we explored the well-being of youths aged 14 to 35 years old living in Italy with their family of origin through the lens of their political participation. Specifically, we compared

Italian natives (born in Italy from native parents), second-generation Italians (born in Italy or arrived in Italy before the age of 18, with at least one foreign parent), and first-generation youths (those who migrated to Italy at age 18 or over). The migration background is increasingly relevant among youngsters, as the number of immigrants and their offspring in Europe – as well as in Italy, in particular – is expected to grow (OECD 2017a). According to the latest figures, Italy's population of second-generation youths aged 0-35 who were born in Italy or arrived in Italy before 18 years old with at least one foreign parent reached 2.8 million at the beginning of 2019 (Riniolo 2019a). This accounts for 13% of the overall resident population aged 0 to 35.

Italy is a privileged case for the analysis of the political involvement of native youths and youths of migrant origin for several reasons. The situation of young people in Italy is critical: although their number is shrinking, they are experiencing a weakening in their political, social, and economic relevance. Youths are increasingly facing high rates of unemployment, persisting economic dependence on their family of origin, increasing emigration, growing risk of poverty, and renunciation of full achievement of their life plans, becoming a wasted resource and a social cost (Caltabiano and Rosina 2018; ISTAT 2018). At the same time, distrust of institutions is driving low social and political participation (Sloam 2016; Bonanomi et al. 2018). For this reason, some authors have defined *young Italians* as a 'robbed, voiceless generation', referring to a process of *dejuvenation* (Ambrosi and Rosina 2009; Caltabiano and Rosina 2018). The need to study young people in contemporary Italy has been recently reaffirmed (Bello and Cuzzocrea 2018).

In particular, young people of migrant origin face the double burden of being young and having a foreign background in a 'young-unfriendly' country (Ambrosi and Rosina 2009), where diffusion of anti-immigrant rhetoric is widespread (Martinelli 2013). According to the latest Eurobarometer figures, migration is the top concern among the Italian population, followed by the economic situation of the country (Eurobarometer 2019). Moreover, Italy is characterised by a closed political opportunity structure (POS), with strict norms regulating the acquisition of citizenship (Huddleston 2011; Boccagni 2012). Despite this unfavourable context, the visibility of youths with an immigrant

background is increasing (Zinn 2011; Riniolo 2019b). In particular, our data refer to 2012, which corresponds to one of the central periods of 'L'Italia sono anch'io' [I'm Italy too], a campaign aiming to reform the modalities by which citizenship can be acquired (Law 91, 1992) carried out by several players (second-generation activists, trade unions, organizations from the third sector, etc.).

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first quantitative study that focuses on the level, forms, and predictors of youths' participation in Italy, comparing natives and first and second generations at the national level. In this paper, we address the following research questions: (RQ1) Does the migration background (native youths; first-generation and second-generation youths) and migration-related characteristics influence the levels and forms of political participation? And, (RQ2) What is the role of the family of origin in shaping and reproducing inequality in political participation? To tackle the object of the present article, we relied on three bodies of literature: studies on political participation to analytically define the object of our paper, studies on youths to focus on the subjects of our analysis, and research on migrant political integration to analyse the role of the migrant background. To carry out the analysis, we combined data provided by the Survey on the 'Condizione e integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri' [Condition and Social Integration of Foreign Citizens] (CIFC) carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2011–2012, and data collected for the Multipurpose Survey on the 'Aspetti della vita quotidiana' [Aspects of Everyday Life] (AVQ), carried out by ISTAT in 2012.

The present paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 features a brief review of the relationship between well-being and political participation, highlighting their strict intertwinement. The subsequent section covers new forms of youth engagement and its determinants with a specific focus on the role of migrant background and the family of origin. The following section features data and methods, and reveals the variables used to define political participation. After a discussion of the main results, we present our concluding remarks in the final section.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Well-being and Political Participation: a Strong Relationship

In post-industrial societies oriented toward post-materialist values (Inglehart 1990), well-being has become a crucial goal (Noll 2002) and a benchmark for designing, implementing, and evaluating social policies. Nonetheless, the debate on well-being, its analytical definition, its operationalisation, and its determinants is still open. Indeed, well-being is a multidimensional and complex concept that still lacks a standardised definition. Scholars generally recognise that it includes aspects related to both economic resources (such as income) – known as *objective components* – and the non-economic aspects of life – the so-called *subjective components* (OECD 2017b; CMEPSP 2009). Broadly speaking, the concept of well-being refers to a wide range of issues, such as health, quality of work, civic engagement and political participation, freedom of choice, environment, degree of trust, and social capital (Helliwell and Putnam 2004; Arpino and Valk 2018; CMEPSP 2009).

According to the suggestions of the 'Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission', the following eight dimensions must be taken into account to define what well-being means: material living standards, health, education, personal activities, political voice and governance, social connections and relationships, and environment and insecurity (CMEPSP 2009). Subsequently, the OECD proposed an articulation based on the following 11 dimensions to make well-being concrete and measurable (OECD 2011; OECD 2017b): income and wealth, jobs and earnings, housing, health status, work-life balance, education and skills, civic engagement and governance, environmental quality, personal security, and subjective well-being and social connections. In this framework, one aspect present in both proposals is of relevance to the objectives of our paper: political voice (i.e., the engagement in the public sphere through voting, signing a petition, protesting, or engaging in public debate).

Two recent studies conducted in Europe confirm the strong relationship between well-being and political participation (Pacheco and Lange 2010; Eurofound 2018). According to Pacheco and Lange

(2010), political participation fosters life satisfaction due to an increasing perception of self-determination. In addition to this, societies that are more equal in terms of income, are highly educated, less affected by unemployment, and characterised by more upwardly mobility are more likely to have a higher level of political participation (Eurofound 2018, p. 37). Other scholars have focused on political participation as a dependent variable, analysing how and to what extent life satisfaction and well-being (considered as independent variables) influence political participation (Flavin and Keane 2012; Lorenzini 2014). Their studies have suggested that individuals with a higher level of life satisfaction are more likely to vote and to participate in other conventional forms of political participation (Ibidem).

A broad and long-standing debate also regards the conceptualisation of political participation. Several authors (e.g., Barnes and Kaase 1979; Nelson 1979; Conge 1988) have attempted to broaden the classical definition by Verba and Nie (1972), which referred exclusively to a behaviour designed to influence the choice of government personnel and policies, therefore excluding a broad range of activities, particularly the unconventional ones. Overall, as highlighted by Conge (1988), there are two major risks when defining political participation. First, there is the risk of excessively 'stretching' the concept, or including a wide variety of activities outside of the political field. Second, there is the risk of offering a very narrow definition that includes only a limited range of repertoires of actions. It is also worth noting that the same concept of political participation varies across time (Raniolo 2002).

Against this background, the target population of our study – native youths and youths of migrant origin – requires a definition of political participation broad enough to encompass several forms of activities (conventional and unconventional, high-cost and low-cost activities) and capable of taking into account the more recent societal and technological developments (Fox 2014). Taking this into consideration, we decided to start from the definition of political participation offered by Vromen (2003: 82-83): '[A]cts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in'. Based on the criteria proposed by Fox

(2014), we propose that, to further articulate this definition, these acts should be voluntary and lead to tangible or symbolic goals. In addition to this, they should have a deliberate aim, and the target should not necessarily be limited to the state or government (but also to other entities or people).

2.2 Youth Political Participation: the Role of Migrant Background and the Influence of the Family of Origin

The detachment of young generations from politics, particularly in its conventional forms, is a widely debated issue (Beck 1997; Harris et al. 2010; Bichi 2013; Henn and Foard 2014; Loader et al. 2014; Roberts 2015; Batsleer et al. 2017; Briggs 2017; Pickard and Bessant 2018; Pirni and Raffini 2018). Nonetheless, the high visibility and dynamics of the youths in the public scene – as shown by the recent movements against climate change – contradicts the assumption of a generalised political apathy. In particular, according to recent data, younger people are more actively engaged than the elderly in the political field, with the exception of voting turnout, for which the percentage is higher amongst the elderly (Eurofound 2018, p. 36)

Due to a deeply transformed context, characterised by increasing individualism and the central role of social media, forms of political involvement are also remarkably changed *(*Furlong and Cartmel 2007; Bennett 2012; Fox 2014). Several scholars highlight that youngsters have moved away from the traditional forms of political engagement to a series of creative, destructured, horizontal, and non-hierarchical actions (Juris and Pleyers 2009; Pitti 2018). They do so by linking their actions to specific issues, often related to the intimate sphere or everyday life (Gozzo and Sampugnaro 2016). This 'metamorphosis' of youths' political practices is linked to a metamorphosis occurring in several domains of our lives (Beck 2016).

However, the role of traditional political channels should not be underestimated. Parties and trade unions are still crucial for political representation. According to recent Eurobarometer surveys

(Eurobarometer 2011; Eurobarometer 2018), the percentage of youths (15-30 years) in Italy who claimed to have voted in political elections during the last 3 years (at the European, national, regional, or local level) has increased 8 percentage points (from 71% to 79%) between 2011 and 2017. This trend is in contrast with a decrease of 15 percentage points registered in the same period at the European level (ibidem). Accordingly, in our analysis, we included both conventional and unconventional practices of political engagement to address the issue of political participation with a comprehensive approach. Nonetheless, we did not include the classical variable of 'voting', as a part of our sample may not be granted this right.

Literature has widely recognised the role of socio-economic variables in influencing political engagement (among others Verba and Nie 1972; Gallego 2008) with education playing a central role in determining the level of political participation (Eurofound 2018). In addition to these classical variables, research acknowledges the role of the migrant background. Accordingly, several studies controlling for socio-economic and demographic variables, have shown the existence of a significant gap between migrants and natives' political participation in Europe, in terms of voter turnout, representativeness, and non-conventional activities (van Londen et al. 2007; de Rooij 2012; Schulze 2014; Pilati 2018; Ortensi and Riniolo 2019). It is of note that the paths of political integration of migrants and their descendants differ significantly. Although the former socialised in their origin country and probably faced downward mobility after migration, the latter grow up in the educational system of their destination country, possibly speaking the new language fluently and sharing aspirations with their native peers (Ambrosini 2005; Heath 2014; Zanfrini 2016). All these factors influence their opportunities to be politically active. In line with the positive trend characterising second-generation attainments in different domains, such as education and work, and their increasing social and cultural integration in Europe (Heath 2014; Crul et al. 2017; Kalter 2018), empirical research shows that the gap in political participation between second-generation Italians and native Italians tends to be less marked in comparison to the gap between natives and migrants (Sanders et al. 2014). In line with these findings, we expect to find different levels of political participation among

native youths, immigrant youths, and second-generation youths, with the latter scoring similar results to natives. Second-generation youths have been socialised in the same context of their native peers (e.g. school and voluntary associations) and exposed to similar opportunities (Quintelier 2009).

Another crucial aspect influencing the level of youth engagement, as previously mentioned, is the role of family political socialisation. As political socialisation takes place at a young age, parents are crucial agents of political socialisation together with peers, schools, voluntary associations, and social media (Ventura 2001; Quintelier 2015). The family often represents a 'powerful incubator of citizenship' (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, p. 282), in which children of more politically engaged parents are more likely to be interested and involved in politics, themselves (Cicognani et al. 2012). However, scholars have recently critiqued the supposed top-down process of a simple reproduction over generations of beliefs and attitudes, underlining the active role of children and adolescents (Ibidem). Political socialisation is not a unidirectional process (from parents to children and adolescents). The latter may also have the power to influence family attitude, orientations, and beliefs (Ibidem). In line with the importance of family political socialisation, our analysis included the existence (or not) of a family member engaged in the political sphere and its influence on the political participation of their cohabitant children or nephews.

Data and Methods

Data

To compare the political participation of young people with a foreign background with their native peers, we analysed data from two different national household surveys carried out by the ISTAT in 2012. The first source of data was the survey on the CIFC. The CIFC sample is composed of men and women with a foreign background living in the 12,000 families randomly sampled from the civil registry (ISTAT 2014). The second source was the AVQ. The AVQ sample is composed of 46,464 individuals and 19,313 households randomly sampled from the civil registry.

To carry out the current study, we selected individuals from the original sample aged 14 to 35 living in families as children, nieces, or nephews of the head of the household. The final weighted sample was composed of 13,254 individuals: 8,378 from AVQ (63.2%) and 4,876 (36.8%) from CIFC.

Definition of Political Participation.

Based on the literature (Ivaldi et al. 2017; Ortensi and Riniolo 2019), and in light of the debate regarding the analytical definition of political participation, we selected 10 variables in the CIFC and AVQ surveys that are relevant to the study of youth political participation (see Table 1). The attempt was to include both formal and informal political activities also feasible for non-citizens (for this reason, we excluded voting). The 10 selected variables encompass both high-cost activities (e.g. taking part in political meetings, participation to political associations and trade union organisations) and low-cost activities (e.g. seeking information on Italian politics, listening to political debates), conventional (e.g. discussing politics, volunteering for a political party or unions, giving money to a political party), and unconventional forms of political engagement (e.g. political demonstrations).

Table 1 Variables used to define political participation

1) Discussing politics more than once a week in the last 12 months
2) Seeking information on Italian politics at least once a week in the last 12 months
3) Listening to political debates in the last 12 months
4) Volunteering for a political party in the last 12 months
5) Volunteering for a trade union in the last 12 months
6) Taking part in political meetings in the last 12 months
7) Taking part in political demonstrations in the last 12 months
8) Giving money to a political party in the last 12 months
9) Participation to a political association/organization in the last 12 months
10) Participation in a trade union association/organisation in the last 12 months

Despite the effort of covering a wide range of political activities, the definition has some limitations. The 10 indicators do not include the phenomenology of all the political repertoires, especially the most recent and unconventional ones (e.g. new internet-based activism), which would require a dedicated survey. However, the 10 selected indicators – available in the two analysed datasets – may offer the first picture of youth involvement in a series of different political channels (trade unions, parties, political organisations) accessible to both native and migrant youths still lacking political rights.

To perform our analysis, we first regrouped these 10 items into two dependent variables. We considered individuals declaring to have carried out at least one activity from Points 1 to 3 as 'soft political participants' (soft political participation). These activities, which suggest general interest in politics, should be connected to the so-called 'low-cost activities' (de Roij 2012). Individuals declaring to have carried out at least one activity from Points 4 to 10, which are considered the most time-consuming acts, are defined as 'actively engaged political participants' (strong political participation).

Methods

To analyse differences in political participation between youths of foreign origin and natives, we ran three nested probit regression models for both types of political participation considered. Our final dataset contained information on 13,254 individuals aged 14-35 grouped into 6,562 families whose number of members aged 14-35 varied from 1 to 11 and with an average size of 1.8. For this reason, we applied the Huber and White, or sandwich estimator of variance, to all probit regression models to allow for intragroup correlation among individuals living in the same family, relaxing the usual requirement of independence between observations (Rogers 1993).

The two constrained models (M1a & M1b) account for only the covariates regarding the migrant generation. The second models (M2a & M2b) add personal characteristics to the analysis. Finally,

the third models (M3a & M3b) include household characteristics. To investigate the role of family political socialisation, we include two dummy variables accounting for the presence of at least a household member engaged in strong or soft political participation. As the latter variables are endogenous for interviewees' political involvement, Models M3a and M3b are extended probit regression models with two endogenous covariates.

In order to make results more tangible, we will discuss our findings in the form of predicted probabilities (Williams 2012). When useful, we will show pairwise comparisons of regression coefficients to discuss the effect of generation and country of birth. Interested readers will find the full models in the appendix.

Independent variables

We included the following variables

Model 1a & 1b

- *Migration background*: Native (reference); Generation 2 or 1.75 (respectively born in Italy from foreign-born parents who migrated before their child was 6); Generation 1.5 or 1.25 (migrated at the age of 6-12 or 13-17, respectively); first-generation (migrated aged 18 or over).

  We built on the classic criteria offered by Rumbaut (1997); particularly, we grouped Generations 2.0 and 1.75 together because both generations had socialised in the Italian context since early childhood; Generations 1.5 and 1.25 were also grouped together, as they were brought up in the Italian educational system, probably speak fluent Italian, and share the same expectations of their Italian peers (Heath 2014). We then accounted for those who migrated after 18 years old. Newly arrived migrants indeed socialised in their origin country, and probably are less proficient in the destination country's language. In addition to this, they presumably do not hold Italian citizenship (Ibidem).

Models 2a anf 2b add the following respondent's characteristics:

- *Gender*: male and female (reference)
- *Age*: in completed years, with a squared term when needed (numeric)
- *Education*: no title, primary school, junior high school, high school, university graduated (reference)
- *Job position*: Employed (reference), unemployed, inactive (full-time student, homemaker, neither in employment nor education or training [NEET]), other condition
- *Education in Italy*. The interviewee carried out part of his or her educational background in Italy: yes or no (reference)
- *Communication skills*: Difficulty in understanding native Italian speakers: high (reference), moderate, limited, and no difficulty or native speaker
- *Cultural consumptions*. The interviewee read at least one book (any type) in the last 12 months: yes or no (reference)
- *Italian citizenship*: yes or no (reference)
- *Place of birth*: Italy (reference), European Union, other European countries, Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Asia, Other Asian countries, North America and Oceania, or Latina America.

Models 3a and 3b add the following household's characteristics:

- *Number of household members* (in units)
- *Household type*: Couple with children (reference), male single parent, or female single parent
- *Household residence*: Northern Italy (reference), central Italy, or Southern Italy and islands
- *Presence of at least a native Italian living in the household*: yes or no (reference)
- *Homeownership*: yes or no (reference)

- *Poor housing conditions or overcrowding* (subjective evaluation): yes or no (reference)
- *Presence of at least a household member engaged in strong political participation*: yes or no (reference).
- *Presence of at least a household member engaged in soft political participation*: yes or no (reference)

The last two variables are endogenous for the respondent's political participation. The dependent variables for the endogenous covariate regressions are homeownership, poor housing conditions or overcrowding, presence of at least a native Italian living in the household, household type, and number of household members.

Results

Descriptive results

According to our definition, 51.3% of the young natives living with their family of origin are involved in soft political participation, whereas this proportion is only 30.3% among their peers with a foreign background, with virtually no differences across generations (first-generation and second-generation immigrant youths).

Strong political engagement is less diffused in both groups: 14.5% of youths with a native background, and 1.5% of youths with a foreign background were engaged in strong political participation in the 12 months before the survey. The proportion of strong political participation is slightly higher among first-generation migrants (4.7%), but lower among Generations 1.75 and 2 (1.3%), and Generations 1.50 and 1.25 (1.0%).

Table 2 Sample characteristics by type of participation and migrant background.

	Native background sample	*Migrant background sample*

	All	*soft political participants*	*strong political participants*	*All*	*soft political participants*	*strong political participants*
% Males	55.5	58.5	54.0	56.8	59.7	65.5
% First generation	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	11.8	23.4
% Generation 1.25/1.50	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.5	60.3	39.0
% Generation 1.75/2	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.4	27.9	37.6
Mean age	22.4	23.7	22.8	19.4	20.7	23.1
% Employed	31.1	35.1	29.9	25.5	33.2	48.3
% Unemployed	20.0	17.6	14.2	12.2	13.7	11.5
% Inactive	47.7	46.3	55.5	52.9	49.8	40.2
% received part of his/her education in Italy	100.0	100.0	100.0	72.6	80.5	58.0
% Read at least a book in the last 12 months	56.8	66.6	70.9	49.1	65.9	50.5
No education	0.2	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.4	0.0
Primary education	2.9	1.0	0.5	13.0	4.8	0.3
Junior high school education	41.5	30.6	38.5	51.6	44.3	24.1
High school education	43.5	51.2	45.8	30.9	44.7	59.7
University education	11.8	17.2	15.2	2.4	4.8	15.8
% Italian citizen	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.0	15.8	4.4
% Difficulty in understanding native Italian speakers: Not at all	100.0	100.0	100.0	81.9	91.8	87.9
Place of birth: Italy	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.0	11.7	7.5
Place of birth: European Union	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.8	20.6	28.0
Place of birth: Other European Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.2	31.4	36.9
Place of birth: Northern Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.4	13.2	14.6
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	2.6	3.3
Place of birth: Eastern Asia	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	5.9	0.0
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.7	5.1	0.0
Place of birth: North America and Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
Place of birth: Latin America	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.1	9.6	9.8
% Living in a house owned by the family	76.1	79.8.7	81.9	31.4	37.2	30.7
% Living in poor housing conditions or overcrowding	17.4	15.2	14.5	33.7	29.7	51.6
% Living in a family with both parents	79.4	80.2	80.7	78.5	79.2	80.4
% Living in a single mother household	16.3	16.1	15.0	16.6	17.4	10.3
Mean size of the household	3.7	4.3	3.7	4.4	3.6	3.4
% Living in Northern Italy	45.2	48.8	44.1	63.3	65.2	50.2
% Living with an Italian Native	100.0	100.0	100.0	13.9	21.5	17.7
% Living with a person engaged in strong political participation	13.4	19.3	57.6	0.5	1.0	18.7
% Living with a person engaged in soft political participation	66.8	94.0	85.4	37.1	81.8	38.8

When we analysed the two forms of participation, we observed that 69.2% of youths with a foreign background (considering both first and second generations) were politically inactive (i.e., engaged in neither soft nor strong political participation), whereas this proportion was only 45.8% among young natives. At the same time, 11.6% of young natives were strong and soft political participants, whereas the same proportion was only 1.0% among peers with a foreign background. Data show that we cannot

consider the two forms of participation as a continuum. In fact, in both subsamples, some strong political participants are not engaged in soft political participation and vice–versa (Table 3).

Table 3 Soft and strong political participation by migration background

Native background

N		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	3839	3324	7163
	Yes	245	969	1215
	Total	4084	4294	8378

Row percentage		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	53.6%	46.4%	100.0%
	Yes	20.2%	79.8%	100.0%
	Total	48.7%	51.3%	100.0%

Column percentages		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	94.0%	77.4%	85.5%
	Yes	6.0%	22.6%	14.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Total percentages		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	45.8%	39.7%	85.5%
	Yes	2.9%	11.6%	14.5%
	Total	48.7%	51.3%	100.0%

Foreign background

N		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	3374	1428	4802
	Yes	25	49	74
	Total	3399	1477	4876

Row percentage		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	70.3%	29.7%	100.0%
	Yes	33.8%	66.2%	100.0%
	Total	69.7%	30.3%	100.0%

Column percentages		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	99.3%	96.7%	98.5%
	Yes	0.7%	3.3%	1.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Total percentages		Soft Political Participation: No	Yes	Total
Strong Political Participation	No	69.2%	29.3%	98.5%
	Yes	0.5%	1.0%	1.5%
	Total	69.7%	30.3%	100.0%

Among native soft political participants, 22.6% were also engaged in strong political participation. At the same time, 79.8% of young natives involved in strong political participation were also soft political participants. The corresponding proportions observed among young peers with a foreign background were 3.3% and 66.2%, respectively.

Multivariate results

In this section, we focus on differences in political participation for young men and women aged 14-35 living with their family of origin by migrant generation (natives, first-, and second-generation individuals). We will present and comment on the variation in the coefficient and the predicted probabilities of the covariate controlling for the migrant generation between nested models. Although

differences according to the migrant background are our primary dimension of interest, we show the full models in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, and briefly comment on selected household and migration-related covariates.

Soft Political Participation. Results from the constrained model (M1a) confirm the result of descriptive analysis by showing that the gap in soft political participation between natives aged 14 to 35 living with their families of origin and their migrant peers is statistically significant, with no differences according to the generation of birth (Table 4). However, differences amongst natives are almost fully explained by respondent characteristics. Coefficients for model M2a shows that, after controlling for respondents' features, the only differences between natives and second-generation migrants remain significant. Model M3a brings additional explanation in the analysis of the gaps in soft political participation between natives and their migrant peers. After controlling for family characteristics, particularly for the number of family members involved in soft and strong political participation (family political socialisation), we observed that political participation is significantly higher for young migrants compared to their native peers.

Table 4 Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of soft political participation by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1a, M2a, M3a.

	Model M1a		**Model M2a**		**Model M3a**	
	Contrast	Std. Err.	Contrast	Std. Err.	Contrast	Std. Err.
Generation 1.50/1.25 vs Generation 1.75/2	-0.016	0.114	-0.018	0.151	-0.041	0.189
Generation 1 vs Generation 1.75/2	-0.035	0.143	-0.063	0.209	-0.100	0.221
Natives vs Generation 1.75/2	-0.534***	0.099	0.164	0.152	-0.610***	0.169
Generation 1 vs Generation 1.50/1.25	-0.019	0.121	-0.045	0.149	-0.059	0.127
Natives vs Generation 1.50/1.25	0.549***	0.065	0.182	0.208	-0.569*	0.231
Natives vs Generation 1	0.568***	0.108	.227	0.250	-0.510*	0.257

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The predicted probabilities changed accordingly: After controlling for personal (M2a) and household characteristics (M3a), the predicted probabilities of being soft political participants reduce for natives from 0.5 to 0.4, but they rise from 0.3 to over 0. 5 for young migrants (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of soft political participation by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1a, M2a, M3a



Differences in soft political participation by country of births are scarcely significant with very marginal participation levels for the youths born in Northern America and Oceania (Table 5). We also observed that naturalisation does not significantly impact on political participation, which is in line with results from previous studies (Quintelier 2009). The predicted probability of naturalised Italian citizens being engaged in soft political participation was 0.358*** (IC 0.259- 0.457), and 0.450*** (IC 0.423- 0.477) for both Italian natives and foreign citizens.

Table 5 Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of soft political participation by country of birth, net of control variables for model M3a.

Row vs column	Italy	EU	Other European countries	Northern Africa	Sub-Saharan countries	Other Asian countries	Eastern Asia	Northern America / Oceania
EU	-0.246							
Other European countries	-0.029	0.217						
Northern Africa	0.175	0.421*	0.204					
Sub-Saharan countries	-0.335	-0.087	-0.305	-0.508				
Other Asian countries	-0.015	0.231	0.014	-0.189	0.319			
Eastern Asia	-0.210	0.037	-0.180	-0.384	0.125	-0.194		
Norther America / Oceania	-4.201***	-3.954***	-4.172***	4.376***	-3.867***	-4.186***	-3.991***	
Latin America	-0.427	-0.181	-0.398*	-0.602*	-0.094	-0.412	-0.218	3.773***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Language proficiency is also relevant. The net of other variables in the predicted probability of soft political participation for individuals with no difficulties in understanding Italian was 0.451*** IC 0.424- 0.477), but values for lower levels of proficiency were below 0.38.

Although personal characteristics primarily explain differences in soft political participation by background, our model further suggests that family political socialisation is highly relevant. We also observed that the effects of political involvement of the other members of the household work differently according to the type of engagement considered (Figure 2). Living with at least one household member engaged in soft participation has a massive impact on personal engagement in soft participation. In this study, the effect was higher for the youths with a foreign background (+0.57) compared to their native counterparts (+0.51). We also observed a similar result for strong political participation, but with a much smaller variation between individuals living in households with or without members engaged in strong political participation.

Figure 2 Predicted aga political participation, net of control variables for Model M3a



Strong Political Participation. Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of strong political participation amongst the migrant generation of origin (native youths, first- and second-generation youths) for the constrained model M1b showed statistically significant differences between all migrant generations and natives, as well as across migrant generations (Table 6). Natives are significantly more involved in this form of engagement compared to their migrant peers. However, first-generation migrant youths participate more than their native-born peers, or those who migrated to Italy at a younger age.

Model M2b clarifies that differences in strong political participation between first-generation migrant youths and native youths are fully explained by the respondent's characteristics. Once we controlled for these covariates, the coefficient for natives against first-generation youths remains positive, but is no longer significant. We also observed that the differences between natives and other migrant peers, as well as those between first-generation migrants and Generations 1.50 and 1.25 remain substantial.

Models M3b completes the analysis by showing that the remaining differences in strong political participation are explained by household characteristics, except in the case of the gap between first-generation immigrants and Generations 1.50 and 1.25.

Table 6 Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of strong political participation by migration background, net of control variables

	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Contrast	Std. Err.	Contrast	Std. Err.	Contrast	Std. Err.
Generation 1.50/1.25 vs Generation 1.75/2	-0.106	0.245	-0.171	0.308	-0.176	0.271
Generation 1 vs Generation 1.75/2	0.555*	0.275	0.497	0.370	0.304	0.324
Natives vs Generation 1.75/2	1.169***	0.218	1.069***	0.209	0.235	0.209
Generation 1 vs Generation 1.50/1.25	0.661**	0.203	0.670**	0.240	0.480*	0.230
Natives vs Generation 1.50/1.25	1.275***	0.117	1.242***	0.350	0.411	0.335
Natives vs Generation 1	0.614***	0.172	0.572	0.404	-0.068	0.367

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Predicted probabilities of strong political participation changed accordingly from model M1b to M3b: we observed positive changes for migrants (+0.066 for Generation 1.75 and 2; +0.047 for Generations 1.25 and 1.50; and +0.067 for first-generation), and a negative variation for natives (-0.042).

Figure 3 Predicted probabilities of strong political participation by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1b, M2b, M3b



Table 7 Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of strong political participation by country of birth, net of control variables for model M3b.

Row vs column	Italy	EU	Other European countries	Northern Africa	Sub-Saharan countries	Other Asian countries	Eastern Asia	Northern America and Oceania
EU	-0.051							
Other European countries	0.064	0.115						
Northern Africa	0.275	0.327	0.211					
Sub-Saharan countries	-0.171	-0.120	-0.235	-0.446				
Other Asian countries	-4.335***	-4.284***	-4.399***	-4.610***	-4.164***			
Eastern Asia	-4.358***	-4.306***	-4.421***	-4.634***	-4.187***	-0.023		
Norther America and Oceania	-4.493***	-4.442***	-4.557***	-4.769***	-4.322***	-0.158	-0.136	
Latin America	-0.013	0.039	-0.076	-0.289	0.158	4.322***	4.345***	4.481***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Apart from other covariates, strong political participation is systematically lower for youths born in Asia and North America or Oceania compared to peers born in other countries. We also observed that, again, naturalisation does not significantly impact strong political participation. The predicted probability of being engaged in strong political participation of naturalised Italian citizens was 0.054* (IC 0.008-0.102), whereas it was 0.099*** (IC 0.065- 0.134) for either Italian natives or foreign citizens.

According to our results, language proficiency also positively affects the predicted probability of strong political participation, irrespective of other variables. The predicted probability of strong political participation was 0.099*** (IC 0.065-0.132) for native speakers of Italian or those with high Italian language proficiency, and 0.102* (IC 0.018-0.186) for those with limited difficulties. Other values were lower but not significant.

Finally, we observed that the effect of political socialisation in the family follows a similar pattern observed for soft political participation. Both types of household members' engagement (soft and strong political participation) impacted the political participation of young cohabitant, but the intergenerational effect is by far higher for the same kind of political engagement (Figure 4).

Figure 4 Predicted probabilities of strong political participation amongst youths from migrant backgrounds and presence of at least one household member involved in (a) soft, or (b) strong political participation, net of control variables for Model M3b



The effect of the presence of at least one household member involved in strong political participation on strong political participation was the highest among natives (+0.482) and the lowest among Generations 1.25 and 1.50 (+0.354). The effect of at least one member involved in soft political participation was the highest among first-generation immigrants (+0.019) and, again, the lowest among Generations 1.25 and 1.50 (+0.006).

Discussion and Conclusion

As political participation is a crucial dimension of well-being, youth engagement in the political sphere represents a vital goal of our societies. Our analysis within the Italian context highlights differences in political participation among youths according to their migrant background (RQ1). Specifically, the lower socio-economic background of youths of migrant origin (lower education, higher level of poor housing conditions and lower level of house ownership of immigrant parents in comparison to native parents) negatively affects their political engagement. Indeed our descriptive analysis revealed that youths with a migrant background are more politically disengaged than their native peers (69.2% vs. 45.8%, respectively), and less active in both soft political engagement (30.3% soft political participants among youths of foreign origin vs. 51.3% among natives) and strong political engagement (1.5% strong political participants vs. 14.5%).

Nonetheless, the multivariate analysis brought some unexpected elements into our analysis. Our models revealed that, after controlling for all other variables (socio-economic conditions and family political socialisation), immigrant youths and second-generation youths displayed similar levels of political participation compared to natives. Even more interestingly, when analysing soft political participation and controlling for personal and family characteristics (socio-economic conditions and presence of at least one family member involved in politics), youths with a migrant background showed higher political engagement levels than natives. In other words, when the gap in socio-economic characteristics and family political background was controlled, our data highlighted that immigrant youths and second-generations youths participated in the political field as much their native peers, and were even more interested in politics than natives. With specific regard to family political socialisation, our analysis highlighted that having at least one soft political engaged family member had a stronger effect on soft political engagement than having a strong political engaged family member. On that same note, having at least one strong politically engaged family member revealed a stronger impact on strong political commitment than having a soft political committed family member (RQ2).

These findings suggest the importance of tackling the transmission of socio-economic disadvantages from immigrants to their descendants, which still largely penalises youths of migrant origin (OECD 2017). In particular, the lower involvement level of immigrant parents in politics negatively affects the political engagement of their children. All of these aspects prevent youths with a migrant background from bringing their unique perspective to the public sphere (Humphries et al. 2013), even if an increasing protagonism of second-generation youths is emerging in Italy.

Overall, our analysis confirms the role of classical determinants (socio-economic status, education, family political socialisation) in influencing youth political engagement, and the crucial role of language proficiency for those with a migrant origin. In the Italian context, naturalisation is not, *per se*, a strong driver of political participation, as has been argued in a previous study on immigrant youth political involvement in Belgium (Quintelier 2009). In Italy, the acquisition of Italian citizenship emerges as an identity and symbolic goal, rather than a precondition for political engagement. This is particularly true for those who are born and raised in Italy (Colombo et al. 2009). For others, particularly those who were not born in Italy, Italian citizenship represents a strategic resource in everyday life (Ibidem). Moreover, it is worth noting that, in our sample, very few of the individuals were naturalised, and the 10 selected indicators were not sensitive to naturalisation.

Finally, due to the centrality of political participation in the construction of well-being, the opportunity to be engaged in the political sphere should be offered to all young people, including those with a migrant background. As such, particular attention should be devoted to education, which has a largely positive effect on youths' political engagement. Furthermore, policies promoting the intergenerational mobility of immigrant descendants by addressing their socio-economic disadvantages are expected to have a positive impact on subjective well-being through the enhancement of political participation.

Appendix

Table A1. Coefficient and robust standard error from nested models (M1a, M2a, M3a) on soft solitical participation of youths aged 14-25 living in their family of origin.

	Model M1a		**Model M2a**		**Model M3a**	
Main equation: Soft Political Participation	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Generation: 1.75/2	**-0.534*** **	**(0.0993)**	-0.164	(0.152)	0.610***	(0.169)
Generation: 1.25/1.50	**-0.549*** **	**(0.0648)**	-0.182	(0.208)	0.569*	(0.231)
Generation: 1	**-0.568*** **	**(0.108)**	-0.227	(0.250)	0.510*	(0.257)
Generation: Native	**ref.**	**(.)**	**ref.**	**(.)**	**ref.**	**(.)**
Age			0.196***	(0.0384)	0.106**	(0.0394)
Age squared term			-0.00322***	(0.000763)	-0.00149	(0.000786)
Gender: Male			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Gender: Female			-0.322***	(0.0435)	-0.255***	(0.0518)
Job Position: Employed			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Job Position: Unemployed			-0.148*	(0.0627)	-0.0679	(0.0648)
Job Position: Inactive			0.103	(0.0670)	0.0363	(0.0801)
Job Position: Other			-0.126	(0.140)	-0.326*	(0.143)
Education - Received part of his/her education in Italy: No			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Education - Received part of his/her education in Italy: Yes			0.243	(0.130)	0.0759	(0.109)
Cultural consumptions - read at least a book in the last 12 months: No			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Cultural consumptions - read at least a book in the last 12 months: Yes			0.586***	(0.0452)	0.372***	(0.0502)
Education: No education			-0.454	(0.349)	-0.429	(0.305)
Education: Primary			-0.850***	(0.151)	-0.609***	(0.158)
Education: Junior high school			-0.481***	(0.0835)	-0.261**	(0.0919)
Education: High school			-0.196**	(0.0695)	-0.0278	(0.0679)
Education: University graduated			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Citizenship: Foreign Citizenship			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Citizenship: Italian Citizenship (native or naturalised)			0.0165	(0.181)	-0.345	(0.182)
Place of birth: Italy			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Place of birth: European Union			-0.0737	(0.212)	-0.246	(0.241)
Place of birth: Other European Countries			0.106	(0.209)	-0.0290	(0.249)
Place of birth: Northern Africa			0.159	(0.226)	0.175	(0.235)
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa			-0.507	(0.284)	-0.333	(0.332)
Place of birth: Eastern Asia			-0.0452	(0.252)	-0.0148	(0.282)
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries			-0.127	(0.315)	-0.209	(0.302)

Place of birth: North America and Oceania			-4.430***	(0.209)	-4.201***	(0.309)
Place of birth: Latin America			-0.103	(0.239)	-0.427	(0.268)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: High			-0.813*	(0.349)	-0.266	(0.489)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Moderate			-0.886**	(0.296)	-0.440	(0.321)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Limited			-0.533**	(0.188)	-0.443**	(0.163)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Not at all			ref.	(.)	ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					-0.143*	(0.0606)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					0.165**	(0.0622)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					0.262*	(0.114)
Household type: female single parent with children					0.480***	(0.0671)
Size of the household					-0.0718*	(0.0282)
Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0419	(0.0611)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.0769	(0.0544)
At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation: Yes					2.566***	(0.183)
At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation: Yes					0.912***	(0.267)
Constant	0.0314	(0.201)	-2.765***	(0.515)	-3.252***	(0.522)
Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation					**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.306***	(0.0596)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					-0.226***	(0.0647)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					-0.592***	(0.111)
Household type: female single parent with children					-0.456***	(0.0782)
Size of the household					-0.0277	(0.0279)
Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					-0.118	(0.0672)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					-0.285***	(0.0503)

At least a member of the household is an Italian native: Yes					0.555***	(0.0681)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: No					ref.	(.)
Constant					-0.0351	(0.129)
Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation					**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.227**	(0.0801)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					-0.115	(0.0809)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					-0.201	(0.148)
Household type: female single parent with children					-0.281**	(0.0975)
Size of the household					0.0598	(0.0340)
Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0887	(0.0838)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.262***	(0.0631)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: Yes					1.216***	(0.166)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: No					ref.	(.)
Constant					-2.829***	(0.238)
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in soft political participation;error.Soft political participation)					*-0.582***	*(0.212)*
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation;error.Soft political participation)					*-0.477***	*(0.163)*
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation;error.At least a member of the household engaged in soft political participation)					*0.503****	*(0.0360)*
N	13,254		12,917		12,917	
AIC	17,597.5		14,985.4		32,995.4	

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table A2. Coefficient and robust standard error from nested models (M1b, M2b, M3b) on strong political participation of youths aged 14-25 living in their family of origin. Italy 2012.

Main equation: Strong Political Participation	**Model M1b**		**Model M2b**		**Model M3b**	
Main equation: Strong Political Participation	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**	**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Generation: 1.75/2	***-1.169******	***(0.218)***	**-1.069*** **	**(0.209)**	**-0.235**	**(0.209)**
Generation: 1.25/1.50	***-1.275******	***(0.117)***	**-1.242*** **	**(0.350)**	**-0.411**	**(0.335)**
Generation: 1	***-0.614******	***(0.172)***	**-0.572**	**(0.404)**	**0.0689**	**(0.367)**
Generation: Native	***ref.***	***(.)***	***ref.***	***(.)***	***ref.***	***(.)***
Age			0.0126*	(0.00604)	0.0143*	(0.00604)
Gender: Male			*ref.*	*(.)*	0	(.)
Gender: Female			-0.0608	(0.0510)	-0.0429	(0.0530)
Job Position: Employed			*ref.*	*(.)*	0	(.)
Job Position: Unemployed			-0.135	(0.0728)	-0.156*	(0.0738)
Job Position: Inactive			0.180**	(0.0692)	0.0697	(0.0629)
Job Position: Other			-0.531*	(0.210)	-0.527**	(0.184)
Education - Received part of his/her education in Italy: No			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Education - Received part of his/her education in Italy: Yes			-0.0246	(0.244)	0.0149	(0.227)
Cultural consumptions - read at least a book in the last 12 months: No			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Cultural consumptions - read at least a book in the last 12 months: Yes			0.307***	(0.0538)	0.239***	(0.0503)
Education: No education			-4.635***	(0.106)	-5.521***	(0.775)
Education: Primary			-0.799***	(0.235)	-0.608**	(0.201)
Education: Junior high school			-0.141	(0.0895)	0.0408	(0.0850)
Education: High school			-0.0713	(0.0764)	-0.0164	(0.0729)
Education: University graduated			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Citizenship: Native/Foreign			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Citizenship: Naturalised Italian citizen			-0.500	(0.332)	-0.419	(0.286)
Place of birth: Italy			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Place of birth: European Union			0.0728	(0.363)	-0.0512	(0.314)
Place of birth: Other European Countries			0.177	(0.312)	0.0639	(0.280)
Place of birth: Northern Africa			0.350	(0.555)	0.275	(0.501)
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa			-0.0245	(0.464)	-0.171	(0.455)
Place of birth: Eastern Asia			-4.128***	(0.379)	-4.335***	(0.327)
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries			-3.988***	(0.356)	-4.358***	(0.346)
Place of birth: North America and Oceania			-3.892***	(0.418)	-4.493***	(0.429)
Place of birth: Latin America			0.107	(0.393)	-0.0126	(0.346)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: High			-4.378***	(0.261)	-4.410***	(0.263)

Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Moderate			-0.425	(0.453)	-0.181	(0.409)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Limited			-0.0815	(0.334)	0.0250	(0.295)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Not at all			*ref.*	*(.)*	ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					-0.0792	(0.0752)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					0.198**	(0.0692)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					0.327*	(0.129)
Household type: female single parent with children					0.193	(0.0989)
Size of the household					-0.0792*	(0.0376)
Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0335	(0.0756)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.147*	(0.0700)
At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation: Yes					1.296***	(0.308)
At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation: Yes					1.503***	(0.398)
Constant	-1.058***	(0.0251)	-1.425***	(0.327)	-2.358***	(0.379)
Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household engaged in Soft political participation					**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.312***	(0.0590)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					-0.230***	(0.0645)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					-0.597***	(0.110)
Household type: female single parent with children					-0.458***	(0.0786)
Size of the household					-0.0269*	(0.0282)

Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					-0.123**	(0.0674)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					-0.280***	(0.00501)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: Yes					0.537***	(0.0691)
Constant					-0.0309	(0.0131)
Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation					**Coef.**	**Robust Std. Err.**
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					ref.	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.241**	(0.0795)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					ref.	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					-0.117*	(0.0823)
Household type: Two parents with children					ref.	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					-0.201	(0.0795)
Household type: female single parent with children					-0.291**	(0.102)
Size of the household					0.0591**	(0.0339)
Household residence: Northern Italy					ref.	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0878	(0.0842)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.270***	(0.0629)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: No					ref.	(.)
At least a member of the household is an Italian native: Yes					1.214***	(0.164)
Constant					-2.838***	(0.240)
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in soft political participation;error.Soft political participation)					*-0.666***	*(0.165)*
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation;error.Soft political participation)					*-0.169*	*(0.189)*
corr(error.At least a member of the household engaged in Strong political participation;error.At least a member of the household engaged in soft political participation)					*0.502***	*(0.0375)*
N	13,254		12,917			12,917
AIC	7,679.1		7,215.7			27,809.5

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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