A New Look at the Divorce Revolution in Europe:

Contrasting Adult and Child Perspectives

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Abstract

This study contrasts adult and child perspectives on divorce and separation. Based on retrospective life history data from six European countries (GGS, GHS), we study the risk of divorce and separation from the perspective of adult unions and from the perspective of children born in these unions. The analysis connects adult and child perspectives, focusing on union and birth cohort changes (1945 – 2005) in the associations between parenthood, education, and (parental) separation. Our findings show that two key trends of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) differ substantially between adult and child perspectives. First, the cohort surge in divorce and separation is larger in adults than in children. Second, inequality in the risk of divorce and separation grows faster in children than in adults. For both trends, disparities between adult and child perspectives grow across cohorts, resulting from increasingly negative associations between parenthood, education, and separation. A striking implication is that in several countries, the divorce surge across the SDT has been almost absent for children of higher educated couples.

INTRODUCTION

The divorce surge across the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) has changed the face of families. A large literature has examined the consequences of the "divorce revolution." It is now widely accepted that the effects of divorce are negative both for men and women as well as for the children they might have. Domains that are negatively impacted are well-being, mental health, school outcomes, income, and social relationships (Amato, 2000; Andress, Borgloh, Brockel, Giesselmann, & Hummelsheim, 2006; Fomby & Cherlin, 2007; Härkönen, Bernardi, & Boertien, 2017; Leopold & Kalmijn, 2016; Williams & Dunne-Bryant, 2006). In several societies, divorce has become increasingly concentrated among less-educated people (de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Martin, 2006; Musick & Michelmore, 2018). McLanahan (2004) has famously argued that this gradient in divorce, along with other socially stratified shifts in the SDT, has intensified social disparities in children – a concerning trend labeled "diverging destinies" (McLanahan, 2004).

An assumption that is usually implicit in the literature on divorce trends is that the adult perspective can be directly transposed into the child perspective: If adults are more likely to divorce, then more children will experience parental divorce. Or, similarly, if less-educated adults are more likely to divorce, then the "children of divorce" will be predominantly those of less-educated parents. This change in perspectives, however, is not as straightforward as it seems. First of all, only about half of all divorces involve children (OECD, 2015). Second, if the divorce surge is concentrated in childless couples, rather than in parents, then the trend viewed from the child perspective would be less spectacular than commonly believed when looking simply at population data on divorce rates. Conversely, if the divorce surge is concentrated in couples with children, then it will be even stronger when viewed from the child perspective. Social disparities from the child perspective also depend

on whether the educational gradient in divorce is concentrated in adults with fewer or more children: If the educational gradient in divorce is concentrated in childless couples, then we will not see diverging destinies from the child perspective. Conversely, if the educational gradient in divorce is concentrated in couples with more children, then the divorce experience will be (even) more strongly stratified when viewed from the child perspective.

These considerations demonstrate that although the adult and child perspective on divorce are obviously linked, they cannot be directly transposed into one another. What we know about divorce trends and the increasing social gradient in divorce, however, is based on the adult perspective. Only one previous study has addressed this issue, showing that in Sweden, children of higher-status parents experienced a smaller increase in family instability than children of lower status parents (Kennedy & Thomson, 2010). This important finding calls for a systematic comparison between the two perspectives for a larger number of countries. This is the aim of our paper. In analyzing these two perspectives, we do not intend to compare how adults and children differentially perceive a divorce or how they are differentially affected by a divorce. Instead, we compare adults and children with respect to trends and differentials in the *risk* of divorce. The adult perspective is defined as the probability that couples – with or without children – experience a divorce. The child perspective is defined as the probability that a child experiences parental divorce before reaching adulthood.

We proceed in two steps. First, we examine changes in the risk of divorce from the adult perspective. Our focus in these analyses is on the cohort trend in the association between having children and the risk of divorce. This association is the key link between the adult and the child perspective on divorce because it determines the extent to which the divorce revolution has affected children. Moreover, if this association – and changes therein – are socially stratified, this determines the extent to which the divorce revolution has resulted

in diverging destinies among children. In other words, the core questions revolve around the interaction effects between education, having children, and union cohort, on couples' risk to experience a divorce or separation. Second, we examine changes in the risk of divorce from the child perspective, covering all children born in the unions selected in the first step of the analysis. Our focus in these analyses is on cohort trends in the risk of parental breakup and how these trends are stratified by parents' education. Moreover, we focus on similarities and potential sources of differences between the conclusions that can be drawn from the first step and the second step of the analysis. In doing so, we offer the first systematic investigation linking the adult perspective to the child perspective on the divorce revolution.

To examine the two perspectives, we draw on retrospective life history data from six Western European countries in which rates of divorce have increased during the SDT: Norway, Sweden, Germany, France, Belgium, and the UK. Due to the broad age range in the data, we cover unions over a long period of time, i.e., between 1945 and 2005. Due to the large samples and the systematic approach of the surveys in which complete and detailed union and fertility histories were obtained, our data offer sufficient statistical power to analyze trends. In the six countries combined, our data include 55,308 unions, 17,201 separations, and 80,873 children born in these unions. As we will motivate later, we combine dissolutions of marriage and cohabitation and refer to these as separations.

BACKGROUND

Although no work has systematically compared or connected the adult perspective on divorce to the child perspective on divorce, related research in the fields of demography, family sociology, social stratification, and psychology is relevant to studying the linkage between these two perspectives. To understand how the adult and child perspective are linked at a

given moment in time, the following associations need to be considered: (a) the association between parenthood and divorce, (b) the association between education and divorce, and (c) the interaction effect of parenthood and education on divorce. To understand if and how *trends* are different from the adult perspective and the child perspective, we additionally consider if and how these three associations have changed across cohorts.

The Association Between Parenthood and Divorce

The first line of related research is on the association between parenthood and divorce. A long history of research has shown that the association between parenthood and divorce is negative: Couples with children are less likely to divorce than couples without children (Diekmann & Schmidheiny, 2004; Van Zanten & Van den Brink, 1938; Waite & Lillard, 1991).

This association has been interpreted in terms of three different principles: investment, protection, and selection. According to the investment hypothesis, children protect parents from the risk of divorce. Children are seen as a form of marital-specific capital that locks partners into their marriage, even if the marriage is unhappy (Kalmijn, 1999). This applies to fathers who risk a decline or even a loss of contact to their children after divorce. The mechanism also applies to mothers who may have specialized in domestic labor and thereby increased their economic exist costs (Becker, 1991). According to the protection hypothesis, unhappy couples are aware of the negative effects of divorce on young children and decide, for the sake of their children, to work out their differences. This may either lead to a postponement of divorce until children have left home or to an eventual improvement of the marriage (Klein & Rapp, 2010). The selection hypothesis, finally, is based on a reverse causal argument. Couples who are uncertain about their relationship less often have children (Lillard & Waite, 1993).

Despite the evidence for each hypothesis, it remains difficult to adjudicate between these different interpretations for the negative association between parenthood and divorce. For our purposes, however, the association itself is more important than the underlying mechanisms or causal direction. Considering our linkage of interest, the negative association between parenthood and divorce means that divorce is concentrated in unions without or with fewer children. Therefore, we expect divorce to be more common when viewed from the adult perspective than it is when viewed from the child perspective. This expectation is supported by period data on divorces between 2003 and 2006 showing that in many Western countries, nearly half of all divorces did not involve children (OECD, 2015).

The Association Between Education and Divorce

The second line of related research is on the association between education and divorce. Studies have shown that this association is negative in several Western countries (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Martin, 2006). The expectation of a negative educational gradient in divorce is a demographic backdrop to much of current research in social demography, notably studies motivated by the diverging destinies hypothesis (Bernardi & Radl, 2014). Explanations for why lower educated people are more likely to divorce include worse marital matches (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), higher economic strain that spills over into marital life (Goode, 1962), and reduced capacity of lower educated people to cope with and successfully overcome marital conflict (Conger, Conger, & Martin, 2010). Similar to research on the mechanisms behind the negative association between parenthood and divorce, research on the mechanisms behind the negative association between education and divorce is limited (for an exception, see Boertien & Härkönen, 2018).

Again, the important point for our purposes is the negative association itself, rather than the underlying mechanism. In the absence of further differences, an adult educational

gradient in divorce risk translates into a parental educational gradient when seen from the child perspective. This conversion is a common assumption in the literature on divorce and unequal child outcomes. However, if the relationship between education and divorce varies by parenthood, adult and child perspectives can diverge. If the negative association between education and divorce is larger for parents than for childless couples, the educational gradient will be even larger from the perspective of children. If the association is smaller or absent for parents, the gradient will be smaller or absent for children. To our knowledge, there is no research on this interaction. Yet, related work is suggestive about its nature and direction.

Two arguments suggest that the negative association between education and divorce is stronger in the presence of children. First, the motive and the capacity of shielding children from negative experiences in various domains of life could be stronger in higher educated people, and this includes protection of their own marriage in the interest of children. There is evidence that higher educated people know more about the causes of (mental) health problems (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2008) and that higher educated mothers have better knowledge of their children's emotional development (Huang, Caughy, Genevro, & Miller, 2005; Marjanovic-Umek & Fekonja-Peklaj, 2017). Such differences may result in a better ability to take children's interests into account when deciding about a break-up. While there are no reasons to assume educational differences in how much parents care for their children's well-being, educational differences in knowledge and awareness may result in a stronger association between parenthood and divorce among higher educated couples.

Second, higher educated people may be more cautious about having children if they perceive their relationship to be unstable. Such an effect is plausible given the classic observation that more unplanned births occur among lower educated mothers than among higher educated mothers (Wellings et al., 2013). This means that the selection hypothesis

stipulated above would apply more strongly to higher educated than to lower educated people.

If the negative association between education and divorce is stronger in the presence of children, as these arguments suggest, then this has an obvious implication for our linkage of interest. From the adult perspective, the *overall* educational gradient in divorce is a combination of the weak (or absent) gradient in childless couples and the strong gradient in couples with children. From the child perspective, the gradient by parental education is *only* determined by the strong gradient in parent couples. Accordingly, we expect the educational gradient in divorce to be stronger when viewed from the child perspective than when viewed from the adult perspective.

Cohort Changes

The third line of research is on cohort change in the experience of divorce. The divorce surge is one of the best documented demographic trends of the past century. Divorce rates have increased steeply in all modern societies, although the pace and scope of this trend have varied substantially across countries (OECD, 2008). If we add unmarried unions to the picture – unions which have become an integral part of the life course in the countries we study – the amount of union instability has increased even more strongly (Härkönen, 2014; Kiernan, 2002; Perelli-Harris & Lyons-Amos, 2016). Because divorce and separation trends have been examined only from the perspective of adult unions, there is no direct evidence on the pace, scope, and social stratification of the divorce surge from the child perspective. Several related studies have shown, however, that children's experiences of single parenthood, step-parenthood, and other outcomes of divorce have increased rapidly across cohorts (Thomson, 2014).

The overall expectation of an increasing divorce risk is clear not only from a cohort perspective on adult unions but also from a cohort perspective on the children of these unions. As discussed above, however, we expect that the negative association between parenthood and divorce will suppress the divorce surge, to some extent, when viewed from the child perspective. If the association between parenthood and divorce is constant across union cohorts, then the suppression effect will be similar across earlier and later stages of the divorce surge. If the association changes, then the differences between adult and child perspectives on divorce become a function of cohort.

No study has examined cohort change in the association between parenthood and divorce. There are however reasons to expect a change in this association, although expectations diverge about the direction of this change. The investment hypothesis implies that this association has become less negative because the divorce-related loss of investments in children as marital-specific capital has declined across cohorts. Most notably, the role of fathers after divorce has changed radically: Divorced fathers more often see their children, they more often have a co-parenting arrangement, and their involvement in children's life after divorce has become normalized (Westphal, Poortman, & van der Lippe, 2014). Conversely, divorced mothers have become less stigmatized, which facilitates a normal continuation of the mother-child relationship after divorce. As a result, the loss of marital-specific capital after divorce has been reduced, suggesting that the protective effect of children and therefore the association between children and the risk of divorce has declined over time.

The protection hypothesis and the selection hypotheses, in contrast, imply that the negative association between parenthood and divorce has intensified. Looking at change over time in these aspects, it appears that the protective role of (prospective) parents has increased over time. As divorce has become more common, knowledge about the causes and

consequences of divorce has expanded, along with the availability of preventive services such as relationship counseling, family therapy, and psychotherapy (Olfson, Marcus, Druss, & Pincus, 2002). Applied to the protection hypothesis, this suggests that parents can more effectively protect their children from the risk of divorce. For the same reason, childless couples may deliberate more carefully about having children when their marriage is unstable. These arguments suggest that the association between children and the risk of divorce has increased over time.

Whether and to what extent these countervailing forces have changed the association between parenthood and divorce remains unclear. If it has changed, then this change will influence the linkage between adult and child perspectives on divorce. Specifically, if the negative association between parenthood and divorce has weakened across cohorts (whatever the cause), then the child perspective will increasingly resemble the adult perspective. Conversely, if the negative association has intensified across cohorts, then the child perspective will increasingly diverge from the adult perspective, whereby the divorce surge seen from the adult perspective will be increasingly suppressed when seen from the child perspective. The trend in divorce may not look like a revolution from children's' point of view.

Consideration of cohort change is also important for the association between education and divorce. In this respect, studies have indicated that the negative educational gradient in divorce has intensified across cohorts (de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006). This cohort trend is consistent with theoretical accounts of the higher educated as the spearheads of social change who overcome the legal and normative barriers to divorce earlier than the lower educated (Lesthaeghe, 2014). As barriers vanish across cohorts, the higher economic strain of unions formed among the lower educated will increasingly translate into higher divorce risk (Goode, 1962). An alternative but related

explanation is that the group of lower educated people is shrinking across cohorts and increasingly represents a negative selection in terms of marital matches, marital strain, cognitive ability, and coping resources (Gesthuizen, de Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2005). Although we lack direct evidence on either of these explanations, the evidence is consistent about a cohort increase in the negative educational gradient in divorce.

An increasingly negative educational gradient in divorce can impact on the linkage between adult and child perspectives if fertility differs between education levels. Apart from such compositional effects, the linkage is also impacted if parenthood interacts with cohort change in the educational gradient. A closer look at the protection and selection hypotheses suggests that this interaction effect may be negative. Research has shown that education promotes problem solving capacities in various areas, including family conflict related to marital problems and children. Higher educated people are more confident in their ability to solve problems, show more agency and sense of personal control, are less vulnerable to stress, more often draw on professional support, and more effectively translate professional support into behavioral changes (Ross & Mirowsky, 1999). This means that changing motives and capacities related to the mechanisms of protection and selection may have promoted the protective role of (prospective) parents particularly among later cohorts of higher educated people. These considerations suggest that the negative association between parenthood and divorce has intensified across cohorts especially among the higher educated. If this is true, the divorce surge would look steeper when viewed from the perspective of children of lower educated parents.

A Note on Cohabiting and Married Unions

In the European context of our analysis, cohabitation has become an integral part of the life course. In some countries, cohabitation is a precursor to marriage, in other countries, long-

term cohabitation is also common (Kiernan, 2002). Moreover, the increasing divorce risk has been accompanied by an increasing dissolution risk of unmarried unions (Perelli-Harris & Lyons-Amos, 2016) and the number of births in unmarried unions has also increased (Lappegard, Klusener, & Vignoli, 2018). Although we control for unmarried cohabitation, we caution against a causal interpretation of this cohabitation effect. The decision not to marry is largely a reflection of marital quality and commitment and as such, not a 'determinant' of divorce but rather a possible outcome of (perceived) union stability. Nonetheless, to prevent overestimating the effect of having children, we add cohabitation as a control variable. We also exclude unmarried unions that lasted very briefly (1-2 years) to prevent bias by the dissolution of less committed relationships.

DATA AND METHOD

We analyze six Western European countries: Norway, Sweden, France, Belgium, Germany, and the UK. The UK data were obtained from the General Household Survey of 2005 (GHS)[1] and all remaining data were obtained from the first wave of the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) which were fielded between 2005 and 2013 (Vikat et al., 2007).[2] The GGS data are nationally representative for men and women aged 18-80. The GHS has data is representative of men and women age 16 and older. All datasets offer very large samples (approximately 10,000 respondents each) and elaborate retrospective information on partnerships and fertility. In the UK, only female respondents were asked about marriage and fertility histories. For the GGS, we rely on the Harmonized Histories data file.[3] We used

[1] These pertain to England, Wales and Scotland.
[2] We excluded data from Austria (which had a smaller age range) and the Netherlands (which did not distinguish between marriage and cohabitation).
[3] The Harmonized Histories data file was created by the Non-Marital Childbearing Network (*www.nonmarital.org*) (see Perelli-Harris, B.; Kreyenfeld, M.; Kubisch, K.: Harmonized histories: manual for the preparation of comparative fertility and union histories (2011) Rostock, MPIDR Working Paper WP-2010-

information on all married and unmarried cohabiting unions and use the term separation to refer to the breakup of these unions in our analyses. We excluded short cohabiting unions that ended in the same calendar year as they began or in the year after (5.9% of all unions, 1.8% of all persons). We further excluded respondents who entered a union after age 50 or before age 12, respondents with missing or impossible 'year' data (the year of birth, the year of union, the year or children's birth, or the year of separation), respondents who entered a union before 1945, after 2005, or in the year of the survey, and respondents with missing or uncodable education.

* Table 1 about here *

Measures

Union cohort is the central time variable in both data sets. Because of the wide age range in the GGS and the GHS, we can examine unions that were formed over six decades: between 1945 and 2005. We divided the cohort variable by 10 and centered the variable (within each country) so that the main effects of all variables apply to the 'average' union cohort (approximately 1975). We include quadratic effects of cohort to allow for the slowdown of the divorce surge. For descriptive purposes, we divided cohorts into five-year groups. Table 1 presents the means for all variables by country along with descriptive information about the separations in our data. Figure 1 presents cohort-trends in separation as found in our data (to be discussed below).

011). It harmonizes childbearing and marital histories from 14 countries in the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP) with data from Spain (Spanish Fertility Survey), United Kingdom (British Household Panel Study) and United States (National Survey for Family Growth). Thank you to everyone who helped collect, clean, and harmonize the Harmonized Histories data, especially Karolin Kubisch at MPIDR.

Education pertains to the education of the respondent. Data on (ex-)partner's education are too incomplete to be useful. Education was coded into the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which is comparable across countries. Four categories of ISCED were used (see Table A1 in the appendix). France used an older version of ISCED and in the UK, we preserved the original educational categories (with some collapsing to avoid the presence of very small categories). The categories are hierarchically ranked but not interval-scaled. As we estimate two-way and three-way interactions, we prefer to use a linear variable for education. A straightforward way to convert categories into a linear variable is a scaling based on years of schooling (Schneider, 2011; Schröder & Ganzeboom, 2014). The GGS and the GHS provide information on the age at leaving school. This is not useful as an individual measure, but the average age at leaving school within an educational category is a good proxy for the length of schooling. We recoded the categories into the average age at leaving school (minus six since schooling starts at age 6) as provided in the data for each country. The educational variable ranges from approximately 8 to 18, depending on the country.[4] The scores as well as the educational distributions are presented in Table A1. The variable is centered in the models (within countries) to facilitate the interpretation of interaction and main effects.

All the surveys provide detailed *fertility* histories. We create a time-varying variable coded 1 if a (first) child was born during the union or one year before the union began (to allow for pre-union births). This variable captures the effect of parenthood (in a couple) and does not take the number of children into account. We also explored a linear variable representing the number of children in a union but we found no consistent effects of the number of children on top of the effect of being a parent.

[4] In educational systems with early tracking and a strong presence of vocational tracks, the length of schooling is less informative.

Cohort, education, and parenthood are the central variables of interest. We include the following *control variable*s: marital status (cohabitation versus marriage), age at union formation, union order (whether there was a prior union), and the gender of the respondent. As the educational level of ex-partners is missing in the data, the analysis of separation is necessarily 'one-sided.'

Setup of Analyses for the Adult Perspective

We create a person-year file which starts with the year of union formation and ends with the year of separation or the year of interview if the union is intact at the time of the survey.[5] The risk of separation is estimated using discrete-time event-history models (Yamaguchi, 1991). We include all unions for each respondent and correct the standard errors for the clustering of unions in persons. The year of separation is defined as the year in which the couple stopped living together. When a union ends through widowhood, the case is censored.[6] To align the time windows of the adult and child perspectives, we limit the adult data to the first 25 years of their union. This is close to the average duration in which children in a couple turn 18. The number of unions in our analyses is 55,308 and the number of separations is 17,201.

We explored various ways to model time dependence and found that an optimal fit was obtained by including two variables: a binary variable for the first and second year of the union (in which the divorce risk is very low) and a logged count variable for union duration. Visual inspection shows that this parametrization matches the actual year-to-year risks closely. The logged specification is a parsimonious way of allowing for nonlinear effects of duration.

To answer our research questions, we considered four interactions:

[5] We also examined person-month files, which showed similar results.
[6] This information was not available in the German file.

(a) The interaction between parenthood and cohort, testing if the cohort increase in separation differed between parents and childless couples.

(b) The interaction between education and cohort, testing if the cohort increase in separation is stratified by education.

(c) The interaction between education and parenthood, testing if the association between parenthood and separation is stratified by education.

(d) The three-way interaction between cohort, education, and parenthood, testing if the association between parenthood and education has changed across union cohorts.

We estimate four models for each country (Table 2):

- Model 1 includes time, cohort, education, parenthood, the interaction of education and parenthood, and the control variables.
- Model 2 adds the two-way interactions of cohort and parenthood and cohort and education.
- Model 3 adds the three-way interaction of cohort, parenthood, and education.
- Model 4 is identical to the third model but excludes the control variables.

Although we do not test any theoretical mechanism, it is important to rule out that the effects we find are not due to other, correlated processes and trends. For example, cohabiting unions have spread across cohorts, and these unions are less stable and more often childless (Liefbroer & Dourleijn, 2006). By controlling for cohabitation, we can rule out that parenthood effects and their interactions are simply a product of increasing cohabitation. Similar arguments can be suggested for the age at union formation and for union order, variables that have changed considerably across cohorts. By comparing Model 3 and 4, we are able to see to what extent these processes play a role.

We centered all variables so that the main effects of education and parenthood are defined for the mean values of the interacting variables. For example, the main effect of education applies to the average cohort. To keep the presentation parsimonious, we estimate

interactions with the linear cohort variable. We allowed for quadratic cohort interactions if these improved the model fit in a given country. These results are shown in graphical form (Figure 2) but not in Table 2.

Given the complexity of the model, we illustrate the interactions using the *margins* command in Stata (Williams, 2012). Figure 2 presents predictive margins by education, cohort, and country, evaluated for the 10th year of union duration. The predictive margins are the conditional *yearly* probabilities to separate. To understand these probabilities, they can be converted into separation probabilities for couples given specific union durations. For example, the average conditional separation probability for all countries in the average cohort in the 10th year of union duration is 1.6%. When applying this to a life table while also allowing the probability to depend on duration, as estimated by our model, this corresponds to a 29% separation rate after 20 years of union duration. We present the cohort trend in the probabilities for four groups: lower educated parents, higher educated parents, lower educated non-parents, and higher educated non-parents. Lower educated is defined as 8-10 years of schooling (depending on the country); higher educated is defined as 16-18 years of schooling (depending on the country). Note that parents and non-parents are in reality not distinct groups, as many non-parents become parents across the period of their life course covered in the person-year file.

Adding the Child Perspective

To examine the child perspective, we first created a child file including all children born to our sample of adult unions. In this file, each child born in a union (or one year before the union began) is represented as a case. The number of children in this file is 80,873. Next, we created a person-year file starting with the child's year of birth and ending with either the

year of parental separation, the year of the survey, or the year in which the child turned 18 (whichever was first). Children from earlier unions are not 'transferred' to a new union.

The analysis of the child perspective is conditioned on parenthood and therefore reduced to two core variables: parental education and union cohort. Union cohort is not the same as the child's birth cohort but the correspondence is close ($r = 0.94$) given that we only look at the first 18 years of the child's life. An additional advantage of our design is that education is reported by the parent and not by the child, as is common in retrospective data where respondents are examined in their 'role' as children. This reduces reporting errors and reduces the number of cases with missing data for parental education.

To compare the adult and the child perspective, we pool the person-period files for adults and children and create a variable called *perspective* (1 for children, and 0 for adults). The independent variables are the same in the two data sets: union duration, union cohort, and education (of the adult / the parent). Three models are presented for each country:

- Model 1 includes education, perspective, and the interaction between education and perspective.
- Model 2 adds the two-way interactions of cohort with education and with perspective.
- Model 3 adds the three-way interaction of cohort, education, and perspective.

To estimate the models, we correct the standard errors for the fact that children and adults are connected. Again, all variables are centered within countries. Results are presented in Table 3.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the main differences between the adult and the child perspective. In Figure 3, we show whether trends in separation risks differ between adult and child perspectives, in Figure 4, we show whether educational differentials in these trends are similar or different for adults and children. As we will see shortly, there are both similarities and differences in the two ways of looking at separation. The numbers in the figures are the

expected annual conditional probabilities of separation at duration 10 and the annual conditional probabilities that children experience a parental separation.

FINDINGS

Figure 1 shows a strong increase in the probability to separate in all countries. This is consistent with what has been documented in other research. Interesting to note, however, is that the increase does not level off in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, as has been documented for a number of countries (Härkönen, 2014). This is probably due to the fact that our trends include cohabiting unions. Cohabiting unions have become increasingly common and since these unions are more unstable, this has resulted in a more continuous increase in the overall instability of unions. We also note that our estimates are cohort based instead of period based, as crude divorce rates usually are.

* Figure 1 about here *

Analyses of Adult Separation Risks

We continue with the main variables of interest, first without cohort interactions (Model 1, Table 2). In all countries, we find a strong negative association between parenthood and the risk of separation. The associations are substantial in magnitude but they vary across countries. In most countries, non-parents are between 1.4 and 2.3 times more likely to separate than parents (in terms of their annual odds). The association is weakest in the UK and in Germany and strongest in Norway and Sweden.

In the absence of cohort interactions, we do not see a main effect of education on the risk of separation. We do see a strong interaction, however, between education and

parenthood in five of the six countries. This means that the gap between parents and non-parents in their separation risk is larger among the higher educated than among the less educated. We have offered a number of potential interpretations of this effect. For example, more educated couples who are uncertain about their relationship might be more careful in deciding to have children (selection) or better able to work out their differences in the interest of children (protection). It is also possible that more educated fathers invest more in their children and are therefore more strongly tied into the marriage (investment). We cannot say which of these mechanisms is most relevant, but we do note that the interaction is strong and consistent across countries. Moreover, this interaction has implications for a child perspective on separation, as we will shortly show.

* Table 2 about here *

To what extent have these effects changed across cohorts? Model 2 presents the interaction effects of cohort with parenthood and education. In five of the six countries, we see a negative interaction of parenthood and cohort, showing that the negative parenthood effect has intensified over time. In three of these countries, the interaction is significant. The interaction implies that the gap in separation risk between parents and non-parents has widened and that the historical increase in separation was more pronounced for childless unions. This already suggests that the divorce surge is less pronounced when viewed from the child perspective than it is when viewed from the adult perspective.

The second cohort interaction of interest lies in the educational gradient in separation. There are clear, consistent, and negative interactions between education and union cohort showing that the educational gradient has become (more) negative across cohorts. Given the range of the cohort variable, the results show that the education gradient has changed from

positive in the early cohorts to negative in the later cohorts. The year in which the effect of education becomes negative can be calculated as $\mu_y + 10 (-\beta_1 / \beta_2)$, where μ_y is the average year in a country, β_1 is the main effect, and β_2 is the interaction effect. The years of reversal vary by country between 1979 and 1983, a period which coincides with the peak of the period trend in divorce in these countries (OECD, 2008). The reversal of the education gradient in separation risk confirms earlier studies although the evidence for this smaller subset of countries – only Western Europe – appears more consistent than it was in a larger pool of countries (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006). The conventional interpretation of this trend is that initially, the higher educated were most likely to break the legal and normative barriers to separate, whereas financial strain and possibly cognitive resources started to matter more for the stability of a marriage after normative barriers had vanished.

The most complex – but also most important – aspect of our model is the three-way interaction between education, parenthood, and cohort. Model 3 in Table 2 shows that this interaction is negative in five of the six countries. This means that the educational differential in the association between parenthood and separation has intensified across cohorts. Possible interpretations for this change are that higher educated couples have become increasingly cautious in deciding about having children (selection) or that higher educated couples have become increasingly aware of the negative consequences of separation for children (protection). Regardless of the underlying forces, this interaction has important implications for the contrast between adult and child perspectives on separation, as we will shortly show.

To what extent are the effects that we find due to other, related demographic processes and traits that are relevant for separation? For example, cohabiting couples are known to have a lower separation risk and these couples are also more often childless. To address this, we re-estimate Model 3 *excluding* the control variables (cohabitation, union order, and age at marriage). In line with expectations, the effect of parenthood increases,

although in only three of the six countries (Model 4). The effects of education and the cohort-education interactions do not change much. More importantly, the three-way interactions between education, parenthood, and cohort are stronger in the uncontrolled model and now significant in five of the six countries. Hence, there is some indication that the rise of cohabitation explains part of the education-parenthood interaction but, as we argued in the introduction, we do not regard this as a substantive explanation and we also find significant interactions when controls for cohabitation are *included* (Model 3).

Because of the complexity of these interactions, we illustrate the findings in Figure 2. Figure 2 is based on the predictive margins of Model 3 (with controls) and depicts trends in separation risks for different subgroups. The left-hand graph pertains to respondents with lower education (8-10 years), the right-hand graph pertains to respondents with higher education (16-18 years). In each graph, trends are presented separately for unions with and without children. We see that in all countries, separation risks increase for unions with and without children. However, the divorce surge is more pronounced in childless unions, already suggesting that this trend is considerably stronger when viewed from the adult perspective.

* Figure 2 about here *

The most outstanding feature of the figure is that for lower educated unions, the two trends are often more or less parallel, whereas for higher educated couples, the trends diverge, with a much steeper trend for childless couples. A striking result is that in several countries, the divorce surge is almost absent for higher educated couples with children. For these unions, we see no clear upward trend or even a decline at some point. In sharp contrast, there are clear upward trends for the lower educated, regardless of parent status, and for higher educated childless unions. This illustrates that the three-way interaction of parenthood,

education, and union cohort implies that there was no divorce revolution for higher educated parents.

Adding the Child Perspective

In the models shown in Table 3, we pool adults and children and examine differences between the two perspectives. These results are the first demographic estimates directly comparing adult and child perspectives on separation. A further important feature of adding the child perspective is validating the results obtained from the adult perspective.

Model 1 of Table 3 shows that in each country, there is a large negative effect of the indicator variables for child perspective (vs. adult perspective) implying that separation risks are much lower when viewed from the child perspective. This is an obvious consequence of the negative association between parenthood and the risk of separation. However, the difference between the two perspectives depends to some extent on how we define the risk for adults, or more precisely, on the time frame we choose for studying couples. In additional analyses, presented in Table 4, we estimated the effect of the child perspective variable for different selections of couples: couples in the first 5 years, the first 10 years, the first 15 years, and so on, ending with all durations. We see that the contrast between the adult and child perspectives declines as the time window expands. The explanation is simple but important: With longer union duration, the share of non-parents in the data declines and the demographic experiences of adults and children increasingly look alike. The question of whether children have similar or different (parental) separation risks compared to adults thus depends on when we compare.

* Table 3 about here *

Model 1 further shows that the two-way interaction between education and child perspective is strong, significant, and negative in all six countries, whereas the main effects of education are weak and mostly insignificant. This means that the risk of parental separation, viewed from the child perspective, is clearly more stratified than the risk of separation, viewed from the adult perspective. These findings provide new evidence for the thesis of diverging destinies (McLanahan, 2004).

How has the contrast between adult and child perspectives changed across cohorts? This question is answered by the interaction between perspective and cohort, presented in Model 2 (Table 3). This interaction is negative and significant in all countries except the UK. In each other country, we see that the cohort increase in separation risk is stronger from the adult than from the child perspective. Figure 3 illustrates these findings. These figures are based on the margins derived from a model that contains duration, cohort, the perspective variable and the interaction between perspective (Model 2). Again, quadratic effects are included if significant. The figure nicely illustrates that the divorce surge was less dramatic for children than it was for adults.

* Figure 3 and 4 about here *

Finally, we study how the education gradient in separation differs between adult and child perspectives, and how this contrast has developed across cohorts. In Model 3, we see negative interactions between education and child perspective, showing that the education gradient in separation risk is stronger for children. More importantly, the three-way interactions are negative and significant in five of the six countries. Hence, the negative interaction between education and perspective has intensified across cohorts. Figure 4 illustrates this important finding. While we saw above that the divorce surge was less severe

for children – potentially good news – we now see that the educational differential in separation has widened especially for children – not such good news.

* Table 4 about here *

CONCLUSION

This study aims to reorient thinking about trends in divorce and separation. We demonstrate that these trends differ substantially depending on whether they are viewed from the adult (i.e., couple) or child perspective. The conventional view from the adult perspective has shown a divorce surge of massive scale across the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). It has also shown an increasing socioeconomic gradient in many societies, as divorce and separation have become increasingly concentrated in less-educated people (de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Martin, 2006; Musick & Michelmore, 2018). The implications of these trends for children appear obvious: If adults are more likely to separate, then more children will experience parental separation. And if divorce and separation are concentrated among less-educated adults, then the "children of divorce" will be those of less-educated parents.

This simple conversion from the adult to the child perspective is common but misleading. For example, if the divorce surge and the increasing education gradient in divorce were concentrated in childless unions, then both trends would be absent when viewed from the child perspective. Conversely, if concentrated in parents, both trends would be even stronger when viewed from the child perspective. In contrasting adult and child perspectives

on divorce and separation, we considered factors that influence the linkage between the two perspectives, most notably the associations between parenthood, education, and separation as well as cohort change in these associations.

Our analyses of retrospective life history data (GGS, GHS) from six European countries yielded various new findings, of which the following two are most important: First, the negative association between parenthood and separation has intensified across cohorts. As a consequence, the divorce surge has been less radical for children than for adults. This is true in five of the six countries, and the differences between adult and child perspectives are substantial in scope.

Second, the association between parenthood and separation is stratified by education, and this stratification has intensified across cohorts. As a consequence, inequality in the divorce experience has increased especially for children, in line with the thesis of "diverging destinies" (McLanahan 2004). A striking result is that in several countries, the divorce surge across the SDT has been almost *absent* for children of higher educated couples.

We considered different mechanisms underlying these effects, including changes in the selectivity of parenthood, changes in parents and children "protecting" each other from the risk of divorce, and changes in how these aspects are stratified by education. The presence and relative importance of these mechanisms remain clouded, but their implication is clear: The social demography of divorce and separation differs for adults and children, and the differences between the two perspectives have grown across cohorts.

Adult and child perspectives are pervasive in the literature on divorce and separation, but work that systematically compares and contrasts these perspectives is rare. Our study represents an initial step towards a demographic comparison of adult and child perspectives. Future work can add to our study in at least three ways.

First, given our focus on the associations between parenthood, education, and separation, we did not explore several other factors that can influence the linkage between adult and child perspectives. These include general trends in fertility and cohabitation as well as specific factors such as the timing of fertility in (marital and cohabiting) unions. Second, our profile of the "children of divorce" is incomplete. We based our analyses on changes in the relative risk of divorce and disregarded absolute numbers as well as compositional changes. For example, even if the risk of parental separation has surged in children of the lower educated, the size of this risk group has diminished with educational expansion. To gain better insight into inequality in the divorce experience and the associated notion of diverging destinies, future studies should describe the children of divorce also in terms of cohort size and socioeconomic composition. Third, our comparative scope is necessarily somewhat limited. We have examined six 'representative' Western European countries but did not yet look at societies that differed substantially from our study countries in terms of divorce trends and possible factors underlying the linkage between adult and child perspectives. Fourth, new micro-level research is needed on the link between parenthood and separation. We have discussed mechanisms of investment, protection, and selection, and it is important to test these mechanisms in order to understand which processes are responsible for the changing interaction between parenthood and education that we observed.

These are directions for future research complementing a demographic comparison of adult and child perspectives on divorce are separation. Linking both perspectives, however, will also yield benefits for studies focusing on outcomes in adults and children. For example, analysts commonly assume that the negative effect of parental separation on child outcomes such as well-being, mental health, deviance, and education is partly mediated by the personal crises that mothers and fathers experience throughout the process of separation. Conversely, negative outcomes in adults may be mediated by children's problems following separation.

Long-running genealogical panel studies and multi-actor studies now offer possibilities to observe adults and children jointly across the separation process, thus linking their perspectives in studies on the consequences of divorce for adults and children.

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Table 1. Means by country in person-period file, in first year of observation and in separation year

All years	Age	Education	Years in union	Unmarried	Separated	Child	N
Norway	34.7	14.5	10.54	.24	.02	.72	223,215
Sweden	35.2	14.8	10.69	.36	.02	.68	148,755
France	33.9	11.6	10.72	.21	.02	.72	151,317
Belgium	33.9	12.6	10.76	.19	.02	.61	114,128
Germany	34.7	13.9	10.86	.13	.01	.66	125,558
UK	31.9	11.6	9.61	.19	.03	.59	103,070
First year	Age	Calendar year	Year start marriage	Age start union	Unmarried	Child	N
Norway	25.6	1983.3	1980.9	25.6	.63	.11	14,229
Sweden	25.6	1984.1	1984.3	25.6	.80	.08	9,265
France	25.0	1980.4	1977.6	24.9	.55	.08	9,436
Belgium	24.4	1983.5	1981.5	24.4	.57	.04	7,020
Germany	25.4	1981.6	1980.5	25.4	.50	.12	7,561
UK	24.1	1986.9	1985.9	24.1	.55	.10	7,797
Separation year	Age	Education	Years in union	Calendar year	Unmarried	Child	N
Norway	33.0	14.6	9.31	1992.2	.50	.52	4,385
Sweden	32.6	15.0	8.99	1992.8	.61	.48	3,708
France	33.9	12.1	9.95	1990.9	.50	.56	2,630
Belgium	31.0	13.0	9.22	1994.1	.53	.39	2,191
Germany	32.9	14.0	9.33	1990.8	.36	.54	1,616
UK	30.4	11.7	8.74	1992.7	.34	.51	2,671

Source: Gen

Table 2.- Event-history models of adults experiencing separation

Model 1	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Log time	-.1339**	-.3475**	.0380	.0933~	-.1773**	-.2864**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.392)	(.057)	(.001)	(.000)
First/second year	-3.5725**	-4.0920**	-3.1629**	-3.8266**	-2.9611**	-2.3330**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Union cohort	.2323**	.1645**	.3579**	.4138**	.2823**	.2903**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Cohort squared	-.0650**	-.0352**	-.0362**	-.0310*	-.0439**	-.0944**
	(.000)	(.002)	(.004)	(.018)	(.007)	(.000)
Unmarried couple	.9716**	.7729**	1.1928**	1.4239**	1.2988**	.7536**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Higher order union	.0761	.2245**	.0542	-.0170	.6017**	.2974**
	(.128)	(.000)	(.440)	(.775)	(.000)	(.000)
Age union entry	-.0535**	-.0641**	-.0264**	-.0880**	-.0541**	-.0714**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Education	-.0121*	-.0080	.0021	-.0159~	.0031	-.0113
	(.047)	(.263)	(.768)	(.091)	(.799)	(.322)
Children	-.8508**	-.8091**	-.5094**	-.7428**	-.2947**	-.3172**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Education x kid	-.0306**	-.0387**	-.0266*	-.0396*	-.0175	-.0597**
	(.005)	(.002)	(.048)	(.019)	(.417)	(.007)
Chi-2	3537.0	2550.9	2181.6	2845.5	1277.6	1144.9
Model 2	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Education	.0051	-.0029	.0168*	.0057	.0223~	-.0030
	(.423)	(.683)	(.033)	(.558)	(.074)	(.793)
x cohort	-.0363**	-.0237**	-.0216**	-.0310**	-.0430**	-.0415**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Children	-.7335**	-.7359**	-.4681**	-.5987**	-.2758**	-.3256**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
x cohort	-.1801**	-.1621**	-.0433	-.2338**	-.0548	.0182
	(.000)	(.000)	(.310)	(.000)	(.258)	(.698)
Chi-2	3795.0	2676.5	2197.4	3070.7	1302.8	1161.0
Model 3	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Education	.0038	-.0076	.0142~	.0043	.0228~	-.0071
	(.567)	(.301)	(.074)	(.654)	(.071)	(.536)
x cohort	-.0377**	-.0276**	-.0249**	-.0368**	-.0425**	-.0485**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Children	-.7337**	-.7254**	-.4524**	-.5840**	-.2746**	-.3218**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
x cohort	-.1793**	-.1621**	-.0338	-.2341**	-.0541	.0157
	(.000)	(.000)	(.423)	(.000)	(.265)	(.736)
Education x kid	-.0436**	-.0360*	-.0100	-.0164	-.0437~	-.0707**
	(.002)	(.011)	(.597)	(.405)	(.076)	(.002)
x cohort	-.0120	-.0297**	-.0322**	-.0321*	.0060	-.0484*
	(.247)	(.005)	(.008)	(.018)	(.763)	(.038)
Chi-2	3786.7	2675.0	2199.5	3090.4	1303.9	1163.6

Model 4 (Model 3 without controls)	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Education	-.0146*	-.0205**	.0145$^{\sim}$	.0020	.0105	-.0249*
	(.019)	(.002)	(.069)	(.830)	(.410)	(.028)
x cohort	-.0384**	-.0254**	-.0313**	-.0348**	-.0511**	-.0630**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Children	-.7912**	-.7636**	-.6612**	-.8299**	-.4554**	-.3030**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
x cohort	-.1795**	-.1127**	-.0267	-.2468**	-.1677**	.0275
	(.000)	(.000)	(.513)	(.000)	(.001)	(.549)
Education x kid	-.0503**	-.0708**	-.0431*	-.0726**	-.0631*	-.1168**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.019)	(.000)	(.010)	(.000)
x cohort	-.0261*	-.0410**	-.0307**	-.0443**	.0014	-.0692**
	(.010)	(.000)	(.009)	(.001)	(.944)	(.002)
Chi-2	2517.2	1812.9	1584.3	1683.9	756.7	713.1
Person years	222993	148628	151007	113981	125558	102951
Persons (unions)	11675	7063	8062	5713	6759	6156

Note: All variables centered. Union cohort divided by 10. P-values in parentheses.
$^{\sim}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.- Event-history models of children and adults experiencing (parental) separation

Model 1	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Log time	-.3685**	-.5558**	-.1523**	-.3011**	-.3223**	-.3025**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
First/second year	-1.9234**	-2.2493**	-1.5960**	-2.5029**	-1.6810**	-1.2057**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Union cohort	.3556**	.2086**	.5082**	.4266**	.3896**	.3430**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Union cohort squared	-.0581**	-.0566**	-.0274~	-.0341*	-.0293	-.0211
	(.000)	(.000)	(.063)	(.024)	(.119)	(.372)
Child perspective (ref.: adult)	-.4436**	-.4109**	-.3065**	-.5498**	-.3086**	-.1230**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Chi-2	1504.3	922.4	936.9	773.1	489.1	486.5
Model 2	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Union cohort	.4307**	.2725**	.5662**	.5297**	.4154**	.2965**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Union cohort squared	-.0691**	-.0643**	-.0348*	-.0488**	-.0328~	-.0126
	(.000)	(.000)	(.020)	(.002)	(.083)	(.594)
Child perspective	-.3708**	-.3689**	-.2291**	-.4149**	-.2794**	-.1505**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
x cohort	-.1444**	-.1308**	-.1011**	-.2301**	-.0501*	.0925**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.046)	(.000)
Chi-2	1806.2	1069.0	1164.7	1068.8	566.0	483.6
Model 3	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Union cohort	.4264**	.2704**	.5435**	.5146**	.4159**	.3009**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Union cohort squared	-.0572**	-.0570**	-.0180	-.0342*	-.0356~	-.0008
	(.000)	(.000)	(.247)	(.033)	(.062)	(.972)
Education	-.0018	-.0022	.0225*	.0151	.0145	.0081
	(.785)	(.730)	(.011)	(.121)	(.258)	(.484)
x cohort	-.0226**	-.0097~	-.0143*	-.0124~	-.0383**	-.0427**
	(.000)	(.058)	(.013)	(.081)	(.000)	(.000)
Child perspective	-.3657**	-.3593**	-.2124**	-.3923**	-.2802**	-.1618**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
x cohort	-.1417**	-.1212**	-.0806**	-.2103**	-.0625*	.0883**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.012)	(.000)
Education x Child perspective	-.0200**	-.0375**	-.0185*	-.0469**	-.0346*	-.0926**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.015)	(.000)	(.010)	(.000)
x cohort	-.0182**	-.0243**	-.0185**	-.0441**	-.0097	-.0311*
	(.001)	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)	(.371)	(.049)
Chi-2	1877.2	1102.2	1197.2	1150.2	586.2	564.4
Person years[a]	535197	337570	362744	243139	273491	219388
Persons (unions)[b]	11726	7092	8084	5721	7031	6215

Note: All variables centered. Union cohort divided by 10. P-values in parentheses.

[a] This N refers to union-years plus child-years.

[b] This N refers to unions since the children in a specific union have the same id as the union in which they are born.

~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.- Differences in separation risk between adults and children

Effect of child vs. adult	Norway	Sweden	France	Belgium	Germany	UK
Time window as is	-.4437**	-.4097**	-.3068**	-.5488**	-.3097**	-.1322**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Time window < 20	-.4596**	-.4512**	-.3269**	-.6160**	-.3185**	-.1356**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Time window < 15	-.5243**	-.5269**	-.3846**	-.7457**	-.3637**	-.1466**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Time window < 10	-.6085**	-.6348**	-.4340**	-.9534**	-.4347**	-.1751**
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

Note: Based on Model 1 of Table 3 (without the education x generation interaction) using different selections within the person-period data. P-values in parentheses.
~ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A1. Coding of education and educational distributions

Sweden	Score assigned	Percentage
Isced 1/2 Primary & lower secondary	9.9	16.2
Isced 3 Upper secondary	13.8	43.9
Isced 4 Post-secondary	16.4	7.0
Isced 5/6 First/second stage tertiary	18.1	32.9
Norway [a]		
Isced 1/2 Primary & lower secondary	9.9	20.5
Isced 3 Upper secondary	13.8	42.5
Isced 4 Post-secondary	16.4	3.2
Isced 5/6 First/second stage tertiary	18.1	33.7
Belgium		
Isced 1/2 Primary & lower secondary	9.2	31.5
Isced 3 Upper secondary	12.5	32.4
Isced 4 Post-secondary	14.1	1.4
Isced 5/6 First/second stage tertiary	16.2	34.8
Germany		
Isced 1/2 Primary & lower secondary	10.8	13.6
Isced 3 Upper secondary	12.6	54.8
Isced 4 Post-secondary	15.4	5.1
Isced 5/6 First/second stage tertiary	17.4	26.4
France		
Isced 1-2	8.2	32.6
Isced 3A	12.6	10.8
Isced 3B	14.1	2.1
Isced 3C	12.3	28.2
Isced 5B	15.6	8.5
Isced 5A-6	17.1	17.8
UK		
No qualification	9.3	27.1
O-levels	10.8	31.7
A-levels	12.3	14.7
Other higher qualification	12.5	8.1
First degree	14.8	12.6
Higher degree	15.6	5.9

[a] Norway scores are derived from Sweden as there was no variable for the age at leaving school.

Figure 1. Cohort trends in separation



Figure 2. Predicted separation probabilities by education, cohort, and parenthood



Figure 3. Comparing adult and child perspectives on separation



Figure 4. Comparing adult and child perspectives on separation by education